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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.1 This is a report on the published literature on the barriers and facilitators of self- 
directed support. It was undertaken to inform a research study funded by the 
Scottish Government 2009-2011 that is evaluating initiatives in three local 
authorities. These initiatives aim to improve take up of self-directed support for 
people eligible for social care and other public funds. The three test site areas 
are working to reduce bureaucracy; to make the processes easy and ‘light 
touch’; and to provide training and leadership to people working on these 
developments. Scottish Government has provided extra money to assist these 
three authorities and to help people in other areas learn from their experiences. 
1.2 This literature review asked what the barriers are to self-directed support and 
what helps it work (the facilitators) (how the literature was reviewed is 
described at the end of this summary). By literature we mean research that has 
been carried out on self-directed support to find out what works and for whom. 
Research is not extensive and so we also looked at other documents, such as 
case studies, descriptions and commentaries.  
1.3 Our definition of self-directed support was very wide; this is because it means 
different things to different people. We used it as an umbrella term to describe 
a system of publicly funded social care and support that may involve other 
government money. Being publicly funded by local authorities and other parts 
of government means that people have to be eligible for the funding and that in 
some instances they have to pay part or all of the cost, if their income and 
savings are assessed as being enough to make this co-payment. Under the 
system of self-directed support, people are asked to think about what matters 
to them. They can choose to spend the sum allocated to them in a way that 
best meets their needs and is under their control. In many ways it continues a 
system that promotes choice and control that has been running for many years; 
Direct Payments. In England the new system is often called Personal Budgets, 
and sometimes Individual Budgets, but this may apply only to local authority 
funded social care. In Scotland a range of government funds are involved in 
this development. 
1.4 Overall the literature reveals: 
• Much agreement about the barriers to the development of self-directed 
support.; and;  
• Many suggestions and experiences about ways in which self-directed support 
may be facilitated.  
1.5 However, much of the research relates to Direct Payments and there is very 
little evidence about other forms of deployment (the ways in which people can 
choose to manage their money and the ways in which various funds work 
together).  
1.6 Not surprisingly, we found that barriers and facilitators are sometimes linked – 
for example, lack of information is a barrier and good or accessible 
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information appears to be a facilitator. Similarly, lack of legal clarity is a 
barrier, while clarity appears to assist users, carers and practitioners alike. But 
other subjects are not so simple. We found that there were few easy 
conclusions to draw about the management of risk and cost-effectiveness. 
There are not simple trade-offs in these areas. Indeed, many studies tell us 
little about risks and fail to provide details of costs and outcomes or results. 
1.7 We have very little evidence about the best ways to monitor self directed 
support but there are suggestions that ‘light touch’ monitoring may open up 
risks at a number of levels as well as helping to reduce burdens of 
administration. These are matters for wider public debate in Scotland and 
beyond, not least when money is tight. One limit of existing research for today’s 
social care is that it took place before the current recession.  
1.8 There is wide agreement that reduced bureaucracy and less ‘red-tape’ are 
welcome (unless there are concerns about abuse and exploitation) but how 
these actually work is only touched upon by a few studies. Many studies and 
commentaries find it hard to decide what is over- or under-protection and few 
expand on links with adult safeguarding.  
1.9 Leadership may help with promoting changes in practice and in attitudes to 
self-directed support (as it does in any change); however, most commentaries 
and experiences focus on situations where self directed support is an 
innovation rather than mainstream activity. We do not have much evidence 
about the ways to sustain changes, but many commentators note the 
importance of service users and carers supporting each other. Training for 
almost everyone is seen as valuable but there is not too much detail on what 
skills are needed and how they can be developed; sometimes training may just 
describe giving information. 
1.10 Finally, the availability of transitional funding (temporary money to help start 
up a new system while still running the old system) is a helpful spur for 
innovation but we generally have only the views of those people and 
organisations that are likely to gain from this. There is little evidence about the 
long-term effectiveness of self-directed support and its impact on other areas, 
parts of the system, or other groups of users that might have similarly 
welcomed any or extra resources. All these comments support the importance 
of a system wide approach to the rollout of self-directed support and 
understanding of its implications for Scottish citizens. 
 
Specific Barriers 
1.11 The research suggests that many of the barriers to the take up and use of self-
directed support are experienced by service users, carers, practitioners and 
other stakeholders. There is strong evidence that processes and systems have 
not kept pace with the values incorporated under the umbrella term of self-
directed support. Some of the barriers may be resolved by government 
guidance which may reduce confusion and uncertainty. 
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1.12 Within the research the following specific barriers were identified: 
 
System wide levels 
 
• Self-directed support is publicised insufficiently. 
• If the local third sector is not actively involved then practical and peer support 
for individuals may be insufficient. 
• It is not always clear how self-directed support works with other parts of welfare 
or public services. 
• It’s not easy to decide what are health or social care responsibilities and how 
self-directed support systems fit with other provision. 
• Processes and procedures can seem under-developed leading to uncertainty. 
Practice and practitioner levels 
 
• Staff are concerned about their jobs and roles in the light of self-directed 
support. 
• Some fear self-directed support may worsen working conditions for social care 
staff – especially care workers or families. 
• They are concerned that self-directed support may be more expensive than 
block contracts (buying social care in bulk so that unit costs are less). 
Service user and carer levels 
 
• Some feel the administrative burden of self-directed support is too great. 
• Users (or carers) do not always want the responsibility of managing their own 
money/services. 
• Employment of Personal Assistants (PAs) is not always simple. 
• Employment of family members may not be easy or best. 
• Funding allocation systems and the rules on expenditure are not always clear to 
users and carers  
Legal and procedural frameworks  
 
• These may not be clear and lead to worries about accountability and blame 
 
• Rules vary and change, leading to confusion 
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• These may not be sufficiently expert or experienced; they may have other 
demands on their time. 
 
• What happens in a pilot may not be sustainable. 
 
What helps Self-Directed Support? 
1.13 The following facilitators were identified from the research: 
 
 System wide levels 
• Agreements over policy help clarify what is permitted and what the changes are 
intended to bring about. 
• Realistic action plans help to translate aspirations into working practices. 
• Clear implementation procedures provide assurances to staff about their 
employers’ aims. 
 
 Practitioner perspectives  
• Training and skills development are needed so that practitioners can be better 
equipped to work with the new systems and to explain them to others. 
• Staff too can benefit from sharing experiences, problems solving and 
information in networks. 
 
User and carer levels 
• Information on self-directed support needs to be accessible and widely 
available.  
• Comprehensive support for users and carers can help when they are thinking 
about change and what might be needed over time. 
• Social networks among users can help in sharing ideas and experiences. 
• Being able to employ family members is welcome by some people. 
• Brokers and advocates who are independent of the local authority can help with 
the details and also in challenging the local authority. 
• Plans to deal with possible emergencies are necessary. 
 
Management and Leadership  
• Self-directed support champions or other inspiring people can help with start up 
and with addressing later problems. 
• A steering group helps spread the load and enables messages about good 
practice and knowledge to reach everyone necessary. 
 
How this study was carried out  
1.14 This report is based on a systematic search of the research literature 
examining self-directed support in social care and factors that act as barriers or 
facilitators to the up-take and development of self-directed support in the United 
Kingdom (UK). We broadened the scope of this study beyond self-directed 
support to include research in the area of personalisation (the term often used 
in England). Several methods helped identify studies and contextual material, 
including the searching of key bibliographic databases, in August 2009 and 
updated in August 2010. The search was primarily conducted using online 
Management and leadership levels 
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research databases (Web of Knowledge, PubMed, Social Care Online). 
Additional searches were also carried out using relevant government (such as 
the Scottish Government and Department of Health) and third sector websites 
(such as In Control) for literature that may not be available on research 
databases.  
 
Next Steps 
1.15 The next stage of the research is investigating what is happening in the three 
local sites in Scotland. This involves collecting data about take-up of self-
directed support and other local authority information. We are interviewing 
people using self-directed support and their carers, and working with managers 
and frontline staff in the local areas.  
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2 INTRODUCTION: DEFINING SELF-DIRECTED SUPPORT 
 
2.1 This study on the published literature on the barriers and facilitators of self-
directed support was undertaken to inform a research study funded by the 
Scottish Government 2009-2011 that is evaluating initiatives in three local 
authorities. These initiatives aim to improve take up of self-directed support for 
people eligible for social care and other public funds. The three test site areas 
are working to reduce bureaucracy; to make the processes easy and ‘light 
touch’; and to provide training and leadership to people working on these 
developments. Scottish Government has provided extra money to assist these 
three authorities and to help people in other areas learn from their experiences. 
2.2 This chapter examines the use of the term self-directed support. Chapter 3 
describes the methodology employed in conducting the review of the published 
literature. Chapters 4 and 5 report on the barriers and facilitators to SDS 
respectively. The final chapter, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings 
and reflects on these in relation to future development of SDS in Scotland. 
 
Defining Self-Directed Support 
2.3 This review uses the term self-directed support (SDS) as an umbrella term. 
SDS is a subject that encompasses many concepts and practices in social 
care; sometimes these are used interchangeably; at other times they have 
different meanings and cultural variations (1) (2). Many definitions and 
descriptions of self directed support are unclear and rely on imprecise terms. 
One of the most common reference points to SDS is the concept of 
personalisation, which has become widely used in England, but this is likewise 
a very broad term, generally using terms such as choice and control 
interchangeably and with little specificity. There are wide advantages to terms 
that are ‘elastic’ in that they can be shaped to local circumstances and are 
adaptable to changing emphases. However, there are also disadvantages, 
such as imprecision, the risk of confusion, misunderstanding and geographical 
variations.  
2.4 The Scottish Executive (3) has been using the following, widely cited, definition 
of SDS: 
Direct payments: 'A term used interchangeably with self directed 
support and appearing in legislation...The definition is historical and 
focused on a system of delivery rather than the flexible independence 
outcomes that individuals can achieve when they choose and control 
their lives. Self directed support is for people who have been assessed 
as needing help from health and social care services, and who would 
like to arrange for their own care and support instead of receiving them 
directly from the local authority. A person must be able to give their 
consent to be on self directed support and be able to manage it even if 
they need help to do this on a day-to-day basis.  
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2.5 More recently, the Scottish Government (4) has employed this definition 
in its National Strategy for SDS:  
 
• Self-Directed Support (SDS) is a term that describes the ways in 
which individuals and families can have informed choice about 
the way support is provided to them. It includes a range of 
options for exercising those choices. Through a co-production 
approach to agreeing individual outcomes, options are considered 
for ways in which available resources can be used so people can 
have greater levels of control over how their support needs are met, 
and by whom. (Emphasis in the original) 
 
• In terms of current take-up, in Scotland 3,678 people received Self- 
Directed Support (Direct Payments) in the year 2009/10. This was an 
increase of 661 (22%) from the 2008/09 level.(5) 
  
2.6 It is important to note that the requirement that individuals must demonstrate 
capacity to consent has been superseded by a change of Regulations in 
England. In particular, new arrangements for proxy decision-making now 
enable other people (such as carers) to consent to and manage social care 
public funding on behalf of users of social care services but the difficulties 
encountered by carers of people with dementia in Scotland in accessing Direct 
Payments suggest that there are other barriers to making care more 
personalised as this report illustrates.(6) In Scotland this area is partially 
covered by the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, Community Care 
(Direct Payments) (Scotland) Regulations 2003, in relation to parental consent 
for young disabled people. The Scottish Executive Guidance on SDS (3) also 
refers to supported decision making, through user controlled trusts, circles of 
support and advocacy.  
 
2.7 Both within Scotland and beyond, there are attempts to clarify the field.(2) (7) A 
recent definition from the Scottish group Changing Lives (8) defines 
personalisation very broadly, and does not confine it to social care or to adults; 
it reads that personalisation: 
 
... enables the individual alone, or in groups, to find the right solutions 
for them and to participate in the delivery of a service. From being a 
recipient of services, citizens can become actively involved in selecting 
and shaping the services they receive. (p1) 
 
2.8 In light of the importance of clarifying terminology, the section below describes 
the various definitions or meanings ascribed to certain key terms.  
 
Personalisation 
2.9 This phrase is often accompanied by the term ‘agenda’, meaning that it is 
government policy or an overarching policy theme; for example: 
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• The government is working hard on its personalisation agenda, 
setting an ambition that all service users have control over the 
support they need.(9) 
 
2.10 From the viewpoint of a Commission set up by an English local authority to 
explore what this might mean more precisely, a definition emerged that  
 
a… ‘personalised’ adult social care system… emphasises the 
individual’s dignity, right to self‐determination, choice, control and 
power over the support services they receive (p7) (10) 
 
2.11 There are also attempts to define personalisation by its antithesis or opposite: 
'The new model of personalisation is much more than ‘direct payments plus’... 
At the heart of the model are the three concepts of user control, choice of 
service and flexibility of support' (p9),(11) although this is not universally agreed. 
More often there are broad aspirations for what personalisation should be: a 
personalised system is one 'which is fair, accessible and responsive to the 
individual needs of those who use services and their carers' and one where 
users should be able to live independently, exercise control over their own life 
and to participate as active and equal citizens in community life (p2).(12) In such 
definitions, the aims are instrumental and personalisation is 'a means of 
offering greater choice, empowerment and freedom' (p19).(13) 
 
2.12 As will be described below, in turning to the specifics, 'personalisation means 
putting people at the heart of the design and delivery of services, giving them 
more choice in how they live their lives and better access to services. 
Developing individual budgets for service users is at the heart of this'.(14) Here 
we begin to encounter definitions of personalisation that are focused on social 
care services in the public sector: 'The aim of the personalisation of social care 
is to ensure that everyone who is eligible for social care support… has more 
choice and control over what that support is, how that support is delivered and 
by whom' (p6).(15) In terms of how such messages are being interpreted, there 
is some evidence that although personalisation is a broad concept, social 
workers generally interpret it in terms of specific initiatives: direct payments 
(DPs), individual budgets (IBs), and so on.(16) 
 
2.13 It is not surprising therefore that there are now efforts to refine definitions: 
 
• Personalisation is, quite simply, the design and delivery of public 
services in accordance with the identified needs and declared 
requirements of each individual rather than the commissioning of 
services perceived to meet the assumed needs of members of 
predetermined groups. (p2)(17) 
 
2.14 This has also revived the political dimension of the definitions: 
 
• Personalisation is a political term being used to describe the 
intended transformation of relationships between government, 
service providers and service users in social care. (p9)(18) 
 
  13 
Direct Payments (DPs) 
2.15 In essence, these are cash payments provided instead of traditional services 
(19) and are: 
 
• a means where disabled people can buy in the help and assistance 
they need for their everyday needs and support… help disabled 
people do things for themselves instead of relying on services 
directly from the Local Authority social services. (p3)(20) 
 
2.16 Policy-makers in England outlined the rationale for DPs as being 'to give 
recipients control over their own life by providing an alternative to social care 
services provided by a local council' (p3)(21). This is a similar basis to policy in 
Scotland. It is important to note that Direct Payments (DPs) are not part of the 
benefits system but are set within publicly funded social care services; 'the 
payments that are made to individuals who have been assessed as needing 
social care services in order that they can make their own arrangements to 
meet their needs' (p1).(22)  
 
2.17 DPs rest on a legislative base: ‘The Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 
1996, which came into force in April 1997, gave local authorities the power to 
offer a direct cash payment in lieu of services to adults assessed as needing 
community care services and new sections 12B and 12C were inserted into the 
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968’ (p4) (23) and section 13 amended. The option 
of offering DPs was at first restricted to people aged 18-65 years. However, 
since July 2000 in Scotland (February 2000 in England) this power was 
extended to include disabled people aged 65 and over, and expanded in 2001 
to include young disabled people between the ages of 16 -18 years. Since June 
2003 in Scotland (April 2003 in England), local authorities are obliged to offer 
DPs to all those eligible. Not surprisingly, research generally uses a shorter 
definition of DPs as ‘user-controlled purchasing of social care’ (p97).(24)  
 
2.18 However, some researchers and activists have emphasised that there is a 
distinction between a DP and a Third Party scheme.(23) In a third party scheme, 
payments are not made directly to the disabled person but to an agency or 
another person. Some researchers only use the term DP in circumstances 
where, ‘the money must be paid by the local authority direct to the disabled 
person.’ (p4). In a few instances, the definition used in a research study notes 
the potential for cash payments to be made to a third party or ‘indirect 
payments’: 
 
• Direct payments is a form of welfare whereby cash payments are 
made directly to the individual to purchase the services they are 
assessed as requiring… The term ‘direct payments’ [in this study] 
is… being used generically to cover all cash payments made to 
individuals to purchase services, whether these are made through a 
third party or not. (pp75-77) (25) 
 
2.19 The literature reveals many different uses of these terms. For example, as the 
paragraph above notes, sometimes DPs are described as being predominantly 
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made directly to the user, generally with a specific service in mind. Other 
descriptions use terms such as Individual Budgets (IBs) when talking about a 
transparent allocation of resources (telling people what they are entitled to in 
terms of the money allocated to them), which may bring together funding from 
several sources.(26) However, some of the definitions offered are not widely 
shared in the literature and need to be carefully examined. For example, there 
are reports that some policy makers see DPs as funding from the LA social 
care budget; self-directed support as funding from multiple streams; and IBs as 
being like SDS but placed in a single bank account to deliver seamless 
support.(27) There is a great need for care over these complicated definitions.   
 
2.20 Despite this, there is wide agreement that DPs enable service users to 
purchase their own support (28) (29) (30) , although there are sometimes unspoken 
assertions that the sums provided under DPs are directly equivalent to the 
costs of LA funded services. In other words, there is not much discussion of 
ways in which some DPs may be less than the total sum awarded because 
various ‘on costs’ are taken out of them before the money reaches the end 
user: 
 
• Direct payments are a means by which people can be given control 
over the resources that would otherwise have been used to pay for 
services to be provided to them. (p19)(31) 
 
2.21 In essence, these definitions suggest that DPs are an alternative funding 
mechanism, sufficient to meet social care needs: 
 
• Direct payments are a means by which people who require social 
care directly receive community care monies so that they can 
choose and pay for their own support to meet their needs.(32) 
 
2.22 There are further implicit suggestions in other studies that once a person has 
been provided with a DP then they are not likely to call on other local authority 
social care services: in these definitions users are described as having ‘control 
over money spent on meeting their community care needs, rather than 
receiving services arranged for them by the local authority' (p459).(33)  
 
2.23 Furthermore, some definitions focus on what can be purchased under the 
mechanism of DPs; one study noted that the system running described itself as 
offering cash payments designed to purchase 'personal assistance': 'The 
payments can be used to pay an agency to provide the support the individual 
wants, as well as to directly employ personal assistants to enable the person to 
live the way they want.' (p644).(34) Goods and equipment might have been hard 
to fund under this system but these were seen as completely acceptable in the 
IB pilots.(35) (36) 
 
2.24 Interestingly, few definitions refer to the potential in England (but not Scotland) 
for carers to receive DPs. Stuart is one of the few that adds carers to users in 
his definition of DPs:  
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• More people than ever before can now choose to have cash 
payments to purchase their own personal assistance rather than 
using services arranged for them by local authorities. This scheme 
is called ‘direct payments’… There are two key components to 
direct payments. The first is the care manager’s assessment of the 
needs of service users and carers… The second component is the 
support services that will help users and carers manage their direct 
payments. (pVIII)(37) 
 
2.25 Lastly, there are definitions that focus on matters in common between terms 
such as DPs and SDS rather than defining difference.(38)  
 
Cash and Counseling (American spelling) 
2.26 Research has generally noted that DPs are found in other developed countries 
but with different terminology. The United States (US) experience is widely 
reported (in the US) and the research there has been longitudinal, in-depth and 
multidimensional. The term used in most US studies is ‘Cash and Counseling’, 
which is defined as the provision of:  
 
• a flexible monthly allowance that consumers can use to hire their 
choice of workers (including relatives) and purchase other services 
and goods that meet their personal assistance needs… Cash and 
Counseling also provides counseling and fiscal assistance to help 
consumers plan and manage their responsibilities and allows them 
to designate representatives (such as family members) to make 
decisions on their behalf. (p2)(39) 
 
2.27 The similarities between Cash and Counseling and DPs are considerable as 
Cash and Counseling is described as 'offering elders and younger persons with 
disabilities a cash allowance in place of agency-delivered services' (p812),(40) 
although the nature of the information services provided differentiate these from 
UK schemes. 'The Cash and Counseling model offers a cash allowance and 
information services to clients so they can purchase personal care services, 
assistive devices, or home modifications that best meet their individual needs.' 
(p646).(41), (42) In contrast to the UK, there has been early development of 'Cash 
and Counseling schemes for all age groups… (it) gives frail elders and adults 
and children with disabilities the option to manage a flexible budget and decide 
for themselves what mix of goods and services will best meet their personal 
care needs.' (p1).(43) 
 
Individual/Personal Budgets 
2.28 Turning to the UK, and in particular, England, individual budgets (IBs) emerged 
early on as a term that virtually summed up the meaning of personalisation in 
adult social care. Many researchers have relied on the Department of Health’s 
definition or ‘product branding’ of IBs:  
 
• [they] bring together various existing funding streams (community care 
purchasing budgets, community equipment budgets, Supporting People 
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funding, Disabled Facilities grants, Independent Living Fund, Access to 
Work) in order to permit social care users to construct care packages to 
suit their needs and provide them with the outcomes that they [want]. 
(p18)(44) 
 
2.29 Definitions mention that this blending of funding streams theoretically enables 
IB ‘holders’ to fund other forms of support than through employment of support 
workers: ‘IBs are a form of individualised funding (IF). In an IF system, disabled 
people are given public funds that they can use to buy services or employ 
support workers’.(45) 
 
2.30 Early in their conceptualisation, there were comments that financial allocations 
were more ‘visible’: 'an individual budget is essentially about being clear with 
people from day one how much is available to spend on meeting their needs, 
and ensuring that the person and those close to them have as much control as 
they want over how this money is spent on their behalf’ (p2).(46) It is evident 
from the start what the resource allocation will be; it is ‘up-front’ (p3).(47) Indeed, 
funding broken down to the level of the individual is prominent in most 
definitions: a personal budget is 'an arrangement which provides disabled and 
older people who are eligible to council social care with "a clear, upfront 
allocation of funding to enable them to make informed choices about how best 
to meet their needs".’ (p22).(48) Nonetheless, other elements are depicted as 
crucial: 'a number of important principles underpin IBs – self-assessment; self-
definition of desirable outcomes, with user choice about how these are 
achieved; integration of funding streams, with clarity about budgets and service 
costs; support for users in planning how to use resources (see the influential 
and detailed evaluation (termed IBSEN) of IBs by Glendinning et al (35)). 
 
2.31 Turning to attempts to distinguish IBs from DPs, several themes emerge: such 
as combined funding streams: DPs are predominantly made directly to the 
user, generally with a specific service in mind. IBs are intended to provide a 
transparent allocation of resources, bringing together funding from several 
sources (26), although the IBSEN study found very little blended funding. Many 
involve social care funding alone or possibly ’combined with Supporting People 
money for housing related support' (49) from the local authority. 
 
2.32 Like the definitions of IBs, newly emerging definitions of personal budgets 
(covering only social care funding) stress the importance of choice and control: 
if someone knows how much money is available to them, and the outcomes to 
be achieved; the person or their advocate could exercise control over the 
money to the extent of spending it when and how seemed right for them.(50) A 
personal budget is also a term used in translation when referring to 
experiences in other parts of Europe: Kremer (51) describes how, across the 
continent, 'patients can now opt for cash and spend that money on the direct 
employment of carers who deliver this care in their own home.' (p385) (note,. 
the Dutch Personal Budget, the focus of Kremer’s article, is highly regulated, 
although it allows for the payment of family carers.) The greater permissiveness 
of IBs is revealed in early studies of how they are being interpreted; for 
example, those who use them have greater flexibility about how to spend 
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money than with DPs.(52) This stands in contrast to the barriers to employing 
close and co-resident relatives under DPs. 
 
2.33 Overall, IBs’ early definitions theoretically allowed and promoted self-
assessment, a monetary budget (not hours per week), allowing direct 
purchasing of services, incorporating several funding streams, and permitting 
this to be spent on a variety of support options.(53) IBs were to combine different 
funding streams, align assessments, encourage self-assessment and introduce 
a transparent Resource Allocation System (RAS) (a system for working out 
how much money a person is entitled to). They were to focus on outcomes and 
allow users to choose where to purchase their support.(54) The IBSEN 
evaluation found limited experiences of blended funding streams (money from 
different parts of the welfare system); and ‘self-assessment’ has been revised 
as a concept because assessment cannot legally be delegated by English local 
authorities.(55) One early aspiration of IBs was also that they might streamline 
‘assessment across agencies responsible for a number of support funding 
streams, resulting in the transparent allocation of resources to an individual, in 
cash or kind, to be spent in ways which suit them' (p3).(56) 
 
2.34 What is common and enduring in many definitions is the focus on control about 
the spending of the allocated resource, even though the term IB is being 
replaced in most (but not all) parts of England by personal budgets, ‘a means of 
giving people more control over the public resources allocated for social care 
services' (p2).(57) Personal budgets may only be related to social care and so 
the debate around choice centres on this area. It is often observed that there 
are various ways of doing this, meaning that while DPs are clearly a sub-set or 
part of personal budgets, there are alternative ways of managing the resource 
through ‘other forms of deployment'. (58) Little evidence exists on other forms of 
deployment to date but they can include legal Trusts or Provider Held 
Accounts.  
 
2.35 In terms of the development of these ideas, many commentators allude to the 
evolution of personal budgets, which built on learning from DP and the In 
Control (IC) programme. IC's key contribution was to develop and model, with 
local authority partners, an alternative 'operating system' – self-directed 
support. 'This aims to shift power to people via major adaptations to the way in 
which social care resources are allocated, controlled and used' (p16).(59) 
 
2.36 Finally, while US literature often refers to Cash and Counselling schemes as 
noted above, some use the term IBs: 'The “individual budget” model is a 
service option that offers beneficiaries an individual budget that they manage to 
obtain services they need, in place of the traditional package of Medicaid 
supports and agency-provided services' (p1).(60)  It is worth noting that they do 
not mean the same as UK examples. 
 
Self-directed support (SDS) 
2.37 Amid the many attempts to locate terms in a history of ideas, are those that 
cast SDS and other descriptors in the disabled people’s movement literature. 
For example, the Department of Health (DH) describes how 'Self-directed 
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support emerged as a means of giving control over services and outcomes to 
individuals, with appropriate support where needed. While self-directed support 
may be in the form of a direct payment, people may also choose to manage it 
in a different way’ (p16).(61) This evolution can also be depicted as a departure. 
'The personalised approach of SDS represents a profound shift in focus: 
instead of being passive recipients of services, older people become active 
participants in their care and support' (p1).(62) More simply, SDS may be 
described as 'self-directed support, where people control their own budgets for 
their own support' (p26) (63) or more guardedly, noting that this relates to the art 
of the possible: 'Self-Directed Support is the name for the whole-system 
change of the current social care system to a system where people are put in 
as much control of their own support as possible' (p3).(64) For some there is an 
emphasis on minimal assessment but this is not generally observed; SDS 
'places control over an individual budget in the hands of the person needing 
support [or their representative]... This is achieved by allocating resources to 
people at the start of the support process and following the completion of a 
simple questionnaire' (p2).(65) 
 
2.38 Thus there is great variety in the definitions of SDS, ranging from that which 
sees it as synonymous with IBs – e.g. SDS gives people an individual budget, 
responsibility for which is shared between the service user and the Local 
Authority. Funds are allocated to this budget through a RAS (resource 
allocation system) and the budget managed by the individual, their 
representative, a social care provider or the local authority (p5),(66) to seeing 
SDS as qualitatively different: e.g. SDS is a continuum of options from DP 
through IB to 'Total Transformation'.(67) At what might be seen as the mid-point 
of the spectrum of definitions, SDS is described as 'when disabled people are 
themselves more directly in charge of, and responsible for, the shaping of 
assistance to meet their needs’ (p44).(68) Even here, at the mid-point, different 
emphases emerge, such as the extent to which people’s choices are supported 
or controlled by professionals; SDS 'allocate[s] people budgets so they can 
shape, with the advice of professionals, the support and services they need' 
(p9).(69) Similarly, some commentators identify the greater role for family 
members in SDS than in other systems: SDS means ‘people work[ing] with 
their families to develop individually tailored packages of support’ (p4).(70) SDS 
'places control over an individual budget in the hands of the person needing 
support [or their representative]… This is achieved by bringing the allocation of 
resources to the front end of the process' (p4).(71) 
 
Other terms 
2.39 Briefly, the literature reveals use of a number of other terms, mentioned below. 
 
Personal Assistance Services program (US) 
2.40 In the United States (US), terms such as 'Personal Assistance Services (PAS) 
refer to help that people use to assist with functional tasks including activities of 
daily living (ADLs) such as bathing and eating, and instrumental ADLs (IADLs) 
such as shopping and preparing meals.' (p28).(72) 'Funded under Medicaid… 
the Personal Assistance Services (PAS) program offers individuals with 
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significant disabilities the opportunity to hire, train and manage their own 
personal assistants to provide essential hands‐on care and complete 
household tasks' (p4).(73) 
 
Individualised funding 
2.41 This term has been used by the influential organisation In Control, and 
describes individualised funding - either direct or indirect payments that enable 
disabled people to manage the funds available for their support.(74) It is also 
used in the US: ‘individualised funding refers to the allocation of support dollars 
directly to the person, in contrast to a service agency' (p72).(75) 
 
Cash for care 
2.42 In the UK, the term ‘cash for care’ has been used to describe DPs and, very 
occasionally, IBs or personal budgets. 'Cash for care schemes are premised on 
the concept of the care-user receiving cash from the state in order to directly 
employ their own labour' (p25).(76) While not generally found in the research 
literature, partly because the term appears imprecise, the term is commonly 
used. 
 
Individualized Quality of Life project 
2.43 In North America, the Individualized Quality of Life (IQOL) project aimed to 
provide to individuals with ID (intellectual disability) and their families, person-
centred planning, access to individualised funding, support in accessing 
community supports, and assistance in monitoring and reviewing their 
individual plans. It also aimed to assist people in developing support networks 
and making meaningful connections to the community (target groups: children 
0-6; young adults; and adults living with their parents).(77) It is sometimes 
referred to in the UK literature. 
 
Consumer-directed care 
2.44 Lastly, the term consumer-directed care, more commonly found in the US, 
describes a system that offers services, assistive technologies and other 
supports over which recipients or their representatives have control. In most 
areas this is Medicaid funded.(78) As with the US Cash and Counseling 
schemes (see above para 1.21), a consumer-directed approach 'support[s] 
more consumer control and choice within service delivery' (p34).(79) The US 
research literature employs both terms; consumer-directed home and 
community services ‘give beneficiaries, rather than agencies, the power to hire, 
train, supervise, and fire workers’ (Executive Summary).(80) 
 
Summary and implications for research 
2.45 Any research on self-directed support needs to carefully describe the 
parameters of this system, with further care to define certain elements of it that 
are used in different ways. It also needs to establish whether the study is 
exploring DPs or other forms of arrangement or deployment. Extensions to a 
scheme should also be noted, for example, the change in DPs that extended 
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them to older people in 2000. Comparisons with SDS schemes internationally 
and between Scotland and other parts of the UK need to be mindful of the 
importance of local contexts e.g. what individuals might have to contribute 
financially to the budget. Lastly, the definitions reveal differences in whether 
SDS schemes are able to offer payments or budgets to disabled people’s 
proxies or representatives. This may affect take-up and the nature of 
disabilities, for example, when a proxy is willing and able to receive a DP then 
this will likely enlarge the numbers of people with dementia having this form of 
support.(6) (81) 
 
  21 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 This report is based on a systematic search of the research literature 
examining self-directed support (SDS) in social care and factors that act as 
barriers or facilitators to the up-take and development of SDS in the United 
Kingdom (UK). Based on the above work outlining the range of definitions 
being employed in this area, we broadened the scope of this study beyond 
what is self-defined as SDS. We used several methods to identify studies and 
contextual material. First, a search of key bibliographic databases was 
undertaken in August 2009 and updated in 2010. The search was primarily 
conducted using online research databases (Web of Knowledge, PubMed, 
Social Care Online). Additional searches were also carried out using relevant 
government (such as the Scottish Government and Department of Health) and 
third sector websites (such as In Control) for literature that may not be available 
on research databases. The references were entered into Endnote X1, a 
bibliographic database. 
 
3.2 To supplement this process, references used in the articles identified were also 
examined to locate any further material. Additionally, the references identified 
through these search methods were compared with those used in the recent 
literature review of personalisation for mental health service users, conducted 
by Val Williams, Pauline Heslop and Helen Spandler for the MIND research 
project ‘Putting Us First’ to which we were kindly given early access. We also 
contacted researchers working in this area to obtain material that is in press. 
We are grateful to them for their assistance. 
 
3.3 Search terms used were (including truncation symbols, exact phrases, and 
Boolean logic): direct payments; self directed support; individual budgets; 
personal budgets; cash and counselling; cash and counselling; personalisation; 
personalization. The searches covered words in the title, abstract or in key 
words. As chapter 1 outlines, a notable feature of this review is that the area is 
in flux with a considerable range of terms being used. While we are using the 
term self-directed support as a general term, for example, many of the articles 
located did not mention this phrase. Commonly found terms included: direct 
payments, individual budgets, personal budgets, and consumer directed care. 
There were also some mentions of person-centred planning/support/care and 
independent living. Particular attention was paid to mention of bureaucracy and 
‘red tape’, to leadership and to transitional funding in order to relate this review 
to Scottish Government policy interests and to the wider study of which this 
review is a part. 
 
Inclusion criteria for search 
3.4 Publications were included if they covered adult social care, were in the English 
language and made reference to barriers and facilitators. In light of the recent 
developments in this area, there was no limit on the date of material accessed. 
 
Exclusion criteria for search 
3.5 Publications were excluded if:  
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• They did not contain evidence of barriers or facilitators of SDS 
• They were statute or regulations 
• They were summaries of reports already cited that did not contain new 
findings or analysis. 
 
3.6 After the online searches, relevant publications were extracted, and the 
database contained 161 references.  
 
Screening procedure 
3.7 The references found through the literature review were read by the review 
team, initially by the abstracts, where available, and a subjective judgement 
about their relevance to the review. If the team agreed that the article or 
material was relevant, the full item was read. Summary notes were then 
created for each of the publications, based on a data extraction tool developed 
by the review team that had been commented on and agreed with the 
Research Advisory Group 
 
Comments on research quality 
3.8 When examining the evidence from across the UK and  internationally(163) the 
limitations of the research base emerge. First, there is much variation in the 
scope and focus of evaluation studies or implementation accounts. Some are 
looking at certain groups or at particular funding approaches. Second, studies 
are often small-scale and/or characterised by small sample sizes with little 
long-term follow up. Third, some accounts are commentaries or hypotheses. 
Furthermore, much of the literature reported the experiences of people who are 
most likely to be offered, or to take up, SDS schemes and therefore when 
looking at barriers to take up, for example, this group may not provide the best 
source of evidence. However, it is important to note the limited evidence base 
for much social care. Direct Payments are among the most studied areas of 
social care and the Evaluation of Individual Budgets (IBSEN study) is one of 
the most detailed and robust studies in social care. 
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4 BARRIERS 
  
4.1 In this section we outline the main barriers to achieving self-directed support 
that have been identified in the research and other literature. These barriers 
have been identified at system wide level; in respect of practitioner experiences 
and expectations; form the point of view of people using services and carers; in 
relation to legal and procedural frameworks and lastly those covering 
management and leadership issues.   
 
System wide 
4.2 One of the consistent comments, and from a variety of sources, is that SDS is 
publicised insufficiently. In this section we outline the various claims made 
about this theme. 
 
4.3 A number of studies and reports comment that the new ways of organising 
social care and increasing options are not known or understood by people 
using services. These have been found in studies of users of various ‘client 
groups’ (29) (80) (the latter relating to older service users), (82) (83) (84) (85) (deaf/blind 
people) (86) (mental health (MH) service users). The authors of such studies generally 
recommend that general publicity be improved. However, a study in Scotland 
also observes that many members of the public are unsure about social care 
provision overall. (87) 
 
4.4 Similarly and perhaps causally related, SDS is reported to be insufficiently 
known among people working in social care services (both in local 
authorities and in provider services). Again, this comment is made on the basis 
of work in various areas of social care, for example, among people working in 
mental health services. The following studies point to lack of staff familiarity 
with the term and system of SDS. This applies to studies of DPs, for example, 
(86) and later expansions to SDS (88) (89) (90) . 
 
4.5 More generally, government studies;(91) overviews (92) and research (93) (35) (70) 
(94) (95) (85) all point to a lack of information or knowledge. There is little 
interrogation of where such learning might take place, and it may be a long-
standing problem. For example, the regulator of social care in England, the 
former Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI ),(84) comments that newly 
qualified social workers were inadequately informed about direct payments 
(DPs) many years after they were introduced (1996). It raised the possibility 
that students are not taught about these during qualifying programmes, as had 
been earlier suggested. (23) 
 
4.6 Within local authorities, specific staff groups not working directly with service 
users are identified as lacking awareness of DPs. This may account for 
perceptions that the new system is still too ‘bureaucratic’ because accountancy 
processes remain unchanged. For example, one study (96) cites lack of 
information among finance department staff as a barrier to the successful 
implementation of DPs. They conclude that finance and administrative staff 
need to understand how money tied up in existing services can be transferred 
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into DPs and to be able to communicate this effectively within the authority (see 
also. (97) 
 
4.7 Overall, there are criticisms that there has long been a lack of accessible 
information on SDS. While this might mean that the information needs to be in 
plain English and easy to read, some researchers talk about this in relation to 
specific groups of potential users. For instance, commentary (98) (37) relates 
such concerns to Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) users. Others make the 
point more generally in relation to all service users (72) (99) (30) (70) The point is 
also made in respect of people with communication needs, for example, about 
deaf/blind people (85) who may need particular support and in relation to people 
with learning disabilities (97). 
 
4.8 Even where people are aware of the principles of SDS there is a view that 
many are confused by the many different terms used in discussing SDS.(84) 
The move in England from individual budgets to personal budgets is an 
example of such confusion for many. (44) (54) (89) (100) (101) 
 
SDS cannot be implemented successfully without an active local third sector 
4.9 This claim is made on the basis that the third sector or voluntary sector may be 
able to advocate for the wider implementation of SDS.(46) (82) (96) (102) (103) At 
one level the voluntary sector may be well placed to advise and support SDS 
recipients.(35) (for MH users) (37) (85) (99) (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) This may be 
because social workers are at risk of becoming overburdened.(110) The 
financing of this activity in the third sector is not reported in terms of costs and 
outcomes. 
 
Relationships between SDS and other benefits  
4.10 It is not clear to many users and practitioners how SDS relates to other 
benefits, such as those that are means tested, eligibility based, and disability 
related.(20) (49) (84) (111-113) (112) (113) In particular, the Independent Living Fund 
arrangements (ILF) cause particular problems (114) for reasons to do with the 
effects of ILF funds on other benefits and the strict ILF criteria.  
 
SDS interfaces with other parts of the public sector are unclear 
4.11 There is some evidence that many users do not understand the divide between 
NHS and local authority services and their remits, and are unsure about what 
services they can purchase with SDS money. (32) (115) This can lead to 
interagency competition or tension about which agency funds certain services 
(particularly for MH service users) if the NHS or local authority tries to transfer 
or shunt costs onto each other. (31) (88) (89) (90) (116) It may be that these problems 
are broader in scope and relate to problems of interagency working between 
NHS and local government. (30) (35) (MH users) (92) (113)  
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Lack of choice 
4.12 However, there are also problems in that users can’t make choices if there 
are not several services or individuals or products for them to decide between.  
 
These deficiencies may be related to: 
• general problems of supply and capacity in social care, the workforce or 
wider;(61) (68) (98) (117) 
• existing services not reflecting users’ needs or being inappropriate; (35) (51) (62) 
(118) (119)  
• services closing as block commissioning contracts are withdrawn; (33) (57) (59) 
(69) (102) (120) 
• LAs paying insufficient attention to market development. (59) (83) (112) (121) 
 
4.13 Others comment that introducing SDS is a slow process; it takes a time to 
become mainstream .(95) (98) (120) (122) Such experiences may contribute to a 
view that the process remains governed by administrative requirements or ‘red 
tape’. For individuals there can be a long interval between application, 
assessment and having the money in their bank accounts.(54) (59) (70) (100) (109) 
(118) (123) (124)  
 
Practitioner experiences and expectations  
4.14 One important barrier is that some staff may think SDS is not ‘appropriate’ for 
particular groups or individuals.  Many studies have found this in relation to 
different groups: 
 
• People using Learning Disability services;(74) (82) (83) (92) (125) 
• People using Mental Health services; (17) (34) (82) (83) (86) (88) (90) (92) (109) (116) (125) 
(126) 
• Older people; (40) (62) (67) (80) (110) (127) 
• Among user groups in general (16) (21) (78) (94) (95) (113) (121) (128) 
 
4.15 The underlying reason for this concern appears to be that staff are anxious that 
SDS has the potential to put vulnerable clients at risk generally of abuse, 
exploitation and general distress, or lack of wellbeing arising from the ‘hassle’ 
of managing new consumer relationships.(11) (17) (26) (35) (47) (67) (74) (76) (88) (90) (91) 
(92) (94) (95) (97) (105) (109) (117) (127) (129) (130) (131) (132) (133) (134) The Evaluation of the 
Individual Budget Network (IBSEN) report in England observes that adult 
safeguarding issues had not been initially considered in many pilots and that 
this was of concern to care managers.(133) Prior to the greater emphasis on 
personal budgets, there were reports that practitioners are concerned about the 
loss of ‘early warning systems’ operating in commissioned services that enable 
them to hear of declining well-being or growing mental distress and so 
intervene in a timely manner.(86) 
 
Staff are concerned about their jobs and roles in the light of SDS 
4.16 The reasons found in published research for this are fivefold: 
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• Because they think they will lose their jobs if services such as day centres 
close or if assessment and monitoring become the reasonability of third sector 
bodies; (23) (56) (59) (83) (88) (102) (110) (122) (127) 
• Because they think they lack the professional skills to work within this 
framework; (1) (67),(135) (the latter referring especially Newly Qualified Social 
Workers);  
• Because they don’t want to relinquish professional control; (44) (46) (59) (64) (98) (104) 
(115) (117) (136) 
• Because they are resistant to system change in general; (11) (17) (52) (64) (88) 
• Because of the administrative burden any new system brings; (47) (77) (95) (110) 
(122) (132), particularly the complexity of administrative procedures (42) 
 
Staff concerns about equity and risk of abuse 
 
4.17 However, there are also concerns based on political interpretations of the 
possible effects of SDS. Some staff express fears about the negative effect that 
SDS will have on existing services and users: 
 
• Because they fear it will lead to inequality or ‘creeping privatisation’;(86) (102) (107)  
• Because they think that wide uptake of SDS will force some existing services 
to close; (125) (132) 
• At individual levels, practitioners also voice concerns that users will misspend 
their money leading to harm or lack of wellbeing. This view relates to a 
number of risks; 
 
o Risks expressed in general terms; (20) (46) (89) (106) (129) (137) 
o Among some there is the view that extending choice may mean that 
people will spend public money on items or services that could be 
seen as ‘frivolous’ (perhaps because non-traditional services may 
be viewed as non-essential) – this could also be a problem if public 
opinion does not support such choices; (17) (59) (67) (69) (93) (110) (133) 
o That there are higher risks of fraud among users; (79) 
o That service users and carers share this worry about risks of 
exploitation, and that it might be carried out by other users; (138) (139) 
o Fear that users’ families/carers will be able to commit fraud or 
abuse users more easily (53) (67) and that insistence or guidance 
about checking any criminal record in respect of people directly 
employed by service users is not enforceable (Disclosure 
Scotland).(3) 
 
4.18 Part of this seems to relate to problems with staff being unsure about what SDS 
monies can legitimately be spent on (92) because of lack of local authority or 
government guidance. In other research, it is pointed out that some of the 
concerns expressed by staff are because they do not understand that users do 
not have to personally manage their budgets (86) (114) (140) and that there are 
multiple forms of deployment or ways or managing personal budgets. Matters 
such as knowing the extent of duty of care were unclear among practitioners 
working in the Individual Budget pilots.(35) In England, the Association of 
Directors of Adult Services published a guide to legal matters arising in relation 
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to personal budgets (55) that addresses, although does not minimise, some of 
these concerns. 
 
SDS may result in poor working conditions for directly employed staff  
4.19 The contention that SDS may result in poor or poorer working conditions for 
people working in social care rests on reports of a lack of support and/or 
training for directly employed care workers and their possible isolation.(27) (56) 
(73) (77) (80) (124) (141) (142) 
 
4.20 Conditions of employment are at risk: people working directly for service 
users may lack employment related benefits; they may be exploited they may 
lack employment contracts and professional or personal boundaries may 
become unclear.(1) (56) (73) (79) (90) (92) (124) (143) The risk of ‘casualisation’ of care 
staff appears to run counter to efforts to increase care workers’ skills.  
 
SDS is a damaging and expensive move from block contracts  
4.21 The risks of this are perceived to lie in the effects on current and future social 
care capacity both privately provided in the market, in the third sector (voluntary 
sector) and in public services. The following assertions have been suggested: 
 
• SDS may create financial insecurity for service providers; (120) (130) 
• Financial uncertainties may result in the closure of some important services; 
(34) (69) (101) (120) especially in rural areas;(57) 
• Local Authorities (LAs) may find it hard to extricate themselves from existing 
contracts and will perhaps have to bear the expense of transitionally to double 
fund SDS and services.(97) (132) (139) (144)  
 
4.22 Some of the problems associated with SDS are seen as ones that may be 
managed by the creation of new job roles, including that of independent 
brokers or navigators (as this review observes later). However, there is 
evidence that the role of the broker is insufficiently defined and rarely costed.(10) 
(77) (121)  Are brokers acting as agents of the local authority, how are they funded, 
to whom are they accountable and do they act in a person’s best interests? 
Indeed, are they really necessary? (145) All these questions remain largely 
unanswered by evidence from research. 
 
4.23 Finally, some earlier research on DPs suggested that staff may view SDS as a 
last resort, for certain complex or cases of concern, not a mainstream 
alternative.(102) (110)  
 
Service user and carer perspectives 
The administrative burden of SDS is too great 
4.24 This point is widely reported by studies directly drawing on the views and 
sometimes the experiences of service user and carers.(19) (34) (35) (51) (78) (83) (84) 
(109) (111) (124) (126) (136) (144) (146)  (147) While this may not be a majority experience, 
these studies cover older people, people with mental health problems and 
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carers. Concerns about administrative burden are also commonly expressed in 
commentaries. More specifically: 
 
• Completion of tax forms may be a particular problem.(91)  
• Some carers spend a long time (typically several hours per week) on 
administration and feel that they should be compensated for this time.(118)  
• There may be a trade-off between the benefits of DP and the administrative 
burden they bring; (28) this may be why ‘less disabled’ people sometimes do 
not opt for DPs because the associated administration or ‘red tape’ is not 
‘worth it’ for the size of DP they will receive.  
• Administration may be a particular challenge to older service users (whose 
health status may be poor).(57) (148) Similar points may apply to about mental 
health service users, (32) especially if they suffer from fluctuating conditions.(86) 
These observations are mainly related to SDS when operating as DPs. 
• Some users experience problems opening bank accounts and feel that the 
system is over-bureaucratic and that there should be a light touch to 
monitoring.(27) Some people are said to be unclear about matters such as 
whether they are permitted to use contingency funding (material from the 
Mental Health Foundation 2009 has recently provided guidance to users and 
the banking industry about some of these challenges). 
 
Users (or carers) may not want the responsibility of managing their own 
money/services 
4.25 This point is widely evidenced, particularly when SDS is proposed or 
introduced, and the details of this are covered in 4.25. While some of the 
research identifies this as a particular concern for older people, studies have 
also investigated the perceptions of carers (11) (54) (62) (older users) (66) (carers) (82) (85) (92) 
(101) (older users) (105) (107) (108) (112) (139) (149) (150) (151) (carers) (152) 
 
4.26 Some carers who are also parents may be over-protective and reluctant to 
allow their adult offspring to take control.(29) (141)  
 
A number of studies point to challenges with the employment of Personal 
Assistants (PAs) 
4.27 They are hard to recruit: 
 
• In general there are reported to be difficulties in recruitment. (2) (29) (78) (85) (97) 
(107) (108) (113) (117) (150) (152) (153) 
• This may be a specific geographical problem, associated, for example, with 
rural areas.(15) (57) (72) (76) (92) (94) (154) However, there are reports that it may be 
easier to recruit in rural or shire counties.(105) 
• This may be a problem if a service user can offer only a few hours’ work. (19) 
(155) 
• It may also be difficult for those without strong social networks which can be 
the most effective way of finding someone who will be suitable and 
available.(43) (123) (156) 
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• This may relate to low rates of pay (77) (96) (132) (note: no studies have taken 
place exampling this in the context of current economic problems and rising 
unemployment). 
• This may be difficult for Black and Minority Ethnic users (37) (suggested in a 
commentary). 
 
4.28 Users find it difficult to manage the employer/employee relationship: Flynn (142) 
observes that users are often friends with or related to their PAs and so 
boundaries (between professional and informal relationships) are unclear. 
 
4.29 There is often no cover in emergencies. (39) (73) (85) (97) (111) 
 
4.30 There may be problems over insurance cover (users don’t tend to have 
this).(118) (149) 
 
4.31 Possibly related to perceptions of excessive ‘red tape’, users experience 
problems opening separate bank accounts for SDS funds.(30) (91) (117) (126) (132),  
 
Negative aspects over the employment of family members 
4.32 In England this has become easier with the development of SDS. Formerly, 
with DPs, this was often only agreed to by the local authority in exceptional 
circumstances. Issues arising include: 
 
• The use of family carers to compensate for a lack of services; this can 
institutionalise a system of low-paid care and make family members 
dependent on the service user for whom they are caring.(119) 
• Family carers may ask for more money than is realistic within the SDS budget 
.(151) 
• Paying family members through SDS might impact on benefits and make the 
family worse off overall.(112) 
• An emphasis on family recruitment might discriminate against users without 
strong social networks.(17) 
• Social expectations that family care is a duty can create suspicion or 
disapproval about paying for this kind of care or treating it as a commodity. 
Carers may feel that they are being harshly judged for accepting payment. 
(137) (138) 
• Users might prefer the authority of an employee/employer relationship rather 
than the complications of paying family members and transgressing social 
norms.(146) 
 
4.33 Other problems arise from judgments that SDS payments are too small to 
ensure high quality support and to promote real user choice. This problem, or 
these perceptions, arise: 
 
• In general but also because some people think of SDS as a cost-cutting 
measure and a way to reduce public expenditure. (19) (68) (93) (118) (126) 
• In the context of being able to pay PAs a reasonable wage.(30) (56) (72) (83) (96) (111) 
(118) (132) (149) This leads to fears that a ‘grey’ or casual market in care staff can 
develop (see above). 
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• Because local authority social care funding is itself insufficient.(9) (14) (17) (57) (90) 
(93) (102) (104) (137) 
• Because NHS monies are not currently included (46) thus making the total 
amount of money available too small to do anything with.  
• As a result of users’ reports that they sometimes have to ‘go without’ in order 
to afford one-off costs or new solutions.(19) 
• Because the subject is no longer ‘glamorous’ when it has moved beyond pilot 
stage when start up monies and resources are no longer available.(68) 
 
Users are unsure of expenditure limits 
4.34 As reported above, some practitioners are unsure about the legitimacy of the 
use of SDS monies. This lack of clarity is also expressed at times by people 
who have experiences of social care support through SDS: 
 
• Because there is said to be no clear guidance.(27) (94) . This lack of clarity was 
found by the IBSEN study (some of these significant uncertainties might have 
arisen in the early days of the pilots).(54) (151)  
 
4.35 One report suggests that users may not understand SDS because they do not 
understand existing services, in other words they do not really know what SDS 
is intended to replace.(21) 
 
4.36 Users too have expressed concerns around training – its amount and its 
content: 
 
• Some users are suspicious of brokers/support staff with too much training. 
They have had bad experiences of social services in the past and view 
‘professionalization’ negatively (45) (see also a later discussion paper) (145)  
• Some users are wary of traditional training routes and want to have a say in 
how their PAs are trained if they are to experience choice and control (142) 
• Users may be put off from SDS if they are asked to undergo substantial 
training on SDS because this gives the impression that managing SDS 
requires a high level of expertise (79) 
 
4.37 We lack evidence about the barriers facing carers; partly because they are 
rarely offered SDS in their own right.(19) (151)  
 
4.38 Users consider that eligibility criteria for services are set too high and that 
they will not be entitled to SDS. Alternatively, users with severe needs may be 
deemed ineligible because they are ‘incapable’ of managing SDS. Fair Access 
to Care Services (FACS) criteria setting thresholds for eligibility have been 
perceived as inconsistent and may not fit well with SDS.(17) (20) (MH users) (26) (67) (88) 
(109) (113) (116) (MH users) (133) (155) (157) 
 
4.39 Users may find it hard to ‘think outside the box’ when imagining solutions that 
could be funded by SDS. (68) (98) (LD users) (140) (158) To address this potential 
problem there are suggestions that keeping a diary to set out specific needs 
and wishes could help; (47) or that providing real life examples may make this 
seem more authentic.(148)  
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Legal and procedural frameworks  
4.40 SDS means that users may rely on new models of support networks. This 
concern does not fit with some findings from some research (94) (125) that LAs are 
choosing to fund their own support services at the cost of existing, user-run 
disability support networks, the latter consequently losing out on funding. 
However, there are other reports (131) of at least one LA entering into contracts 
with two independent support services during a pilot programme: this double 
provision was judged to be excessive and confusing. Others note concerns 
about over reliance on informal support networks; (98) and again the role of 
the broker is unclear. (45) Some point to the potential for conflict of interest if 
a broker is also a service provider (48)  while some say that this can become a 
contested area.(145) 
 
4.41 In terms of risks to users of services, as mentioned above, there are concerns 
that there are no enforceable administrative mechanisms for registering or 
background checking PAs, who could present risks of harm to vulnerable 
people.(26) (49) (79) (94) (110) The Independent Safeguarding Authority is only 
becoming operational in England and Wales at the time of writing and is under 
review (2010). There are uncertainties about who, if anyone, bears 
responsibility for the risks presented e.g. by unregulated PAs,(95) (110) (112) (137) 
although guidance has tried to prospectively address these matters.(55) The 
Commission on Personalisation in its interim report (159) recommends legislation 
enshrining a ‘right to control’, noting that users lack satisfactory means of 
redress when things go wrong and that a lack of regulation leaves them 
vulnerable to exploitation. In England, the Law Commission is due to report on 
adult social care law reform in summer 2011 which may open up debate more 
widely on the legal framework of SDS.  
 
4.42 More practically, there are reports that payments are often delayed, causing 
serious difficulties for service users.(21) (30) (111) (136) (153) 
 
4.43 Some councils offer guidelines on how DP/IB should be spent, which some 
users may view as patronising and restrictive, partly because they seem to 
negate the flexibility that is SDS’ main benefit.(30) (33) (83) (84) (88) (121) (157) (160) 
 
4.44 Integrating funding streams consistently proves difficult, (59) (120) a key finding 
of the Individual Budget pilot evaluation.(35) This may arise because of clashes 
between guidance governing different funds, how they should be spent and 
whom they target.(26) (35) (67) (especially ILF) (91) (especially ILF) (135) The reason for this is 
attributed to a lack of government guidance and powers over integration.(92) 
 
4.45 The resource allocation system (RAS) (the system for allocating the budget 
to users on the basis of need or desired outcomes in the context of means 
testing) can cause problems: 
 
• If there is a major discrepancy between the results of the RAS and the funding 
that a user is currently receiving;(120) 
• Because the RAS is difficult and complicated to devise;(35) (120)  
• Because existing pricing mechanisms are unclear( 
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• Because it discriminates against those living in the family home with 
carers;(144) (161)  
• Because there has been over-reliance on the RAS developed by in Control, 
which is designed for learning disabled people;(35) (76) 
• Because the transparency of RAS can reveal existing inequalities between 
different user groups that then have to be addressed;(11) (50) (135)  
• Because existing charging policies may be badly worked-out or not well 
understood.(106) (133) 
 
4.46 Finally, administrative and procedural problems have been reported in the 
areas around assessment: 
 
• By social workers or care managers:  
o Older users are less likely to actively participate in assessment and 
social workers may collude in this ;(162) 
o Social workers often fill in assessment forms back at the office, 
suggesting that the forms would perhaps reflect their own priorities 
rather than those of the service user;(162) 
o Assessments by social care staff typically reflect existing services’ 
organisation and priorities, rather than people’s needs.(34) (86) (162)  
• People may under or over-estimate their needs in assessment: 
o Users may under- (especially older users) or over-estimate their 
needs;(35) (54) (101)  
o Carers may be overlooked in self-assessment processes;(35) (99) 
o ‘Forms’ or formal systems are inherently limited as a means of 
assessment;(26) (54) (120)  
o It is not clear how self-assessment aligns with LA eligibility criteria 
for social care services.(26) (67) 
 
Management and leadership factors  
4.47 Problems arise around target setting or performance indicators for managers: 
 
• Targets for SDS uptake are not differentiated by user group; 
underrepresented groups like MH users may get lost amongst positive overall 
statistics; (22) (89)  
• An emphasis on targets (such as percentages of people receiving SDS) can 
mean social workers may over-emphasise the benefits SDS for users who 
may not want to take it up; (118)  
• An emphasis on targets can lead to SDS being viewed as an end in itself, 
rather than a means to a more important end (helping users achieve desired 
outcomes); (59) (67) (69) (104) 
• Scottish local authorities have proven resistant to central government targets, 
or have not been given targets.(94) (107) (125) 
 
4.48 Some consider that guidance from central government is vague and unclear. 
That which is intended to be flexible, can result in inconsistency. Practitioners 
who are uncertain of where they stand may shy away from recommending SDS 
to service users.(27) (91) (94) (110) (125) (132) 
  33 
Summary 
4.49 The evidence suggests that many of the barriers to the take up and use of SDS 
are commonly experienced by service users, practitioners and other 
stakeholders. There is strong evidence that processes and systems have not 
kept pace with the values incorporated under the umbrella term of SDS. Some 
of the barriers may be resolved by government guidance, which may reduce 
confusion and uncertainty. The balance of risks does not appear to have been 
informed by evidence from practice. Few studies have considered the costs of 
the recommendations that they proffer. 
 
4.50 The implications for research in this area are that there are many dynamics at 
play when talking of barriers to SDS. Some barriers identified may apply to 
social care support generally, while others reflect the start of many innovations, 
in that there is a lack of clarity initially. The barriers identified here form the 
basis for exploration of SDS in Scotland, building on the considerable research 
evidence from experiences with Direct Payments. 
  34 
5 FACILITATORS  
 
5.1 The research evidence and accounts of practice and personal experiences 
contain many examples of what are termed facilitators or levers that help 
develop the positive outcomes of SDS. These relate to clear policy messages 
and encouragement, to the role of leadership in developing SDS, the reports 
from end users and from carers of the benefits of SDS, flexible and transparent 
policies and procedures, and enthusiasm and good experiences among 
practitioners.  
 
Policy   
5.2 Policy and practice guidelines help support the development of SDS. While the 
role of personal assistants (PAs) (the employment model most often described 
in research and other accounts) may be individually negotiated, there is some 
evidence that this relatively new model of social care support  is assisted in 
policy terms by: 
 
• Clear guidelines, outlining the employee’s role and what is expected;(142) (164) 
• Policy encouragement of the development of networks of support for 
individual PAs;(142) 
• Encouragement for users to minimise risks to themselves by being good 
employers, for example, encouraging people to check references and possibly 
if a PA has a criminal record or has been dismissed from work with vulnerable 
adults..(3) (16) (53) (58) (85) (165) 
 
5.3 Incorporating NHS funding into an IB would significantly increase its size and 
usefulness according to some studies.(46) (120) (135)  . (In parts of England and 
Scotland, the NHS is currently experimenting with individual health budgets).  
 
5.4 LAs should be prepared to monitor SDS spend and support plans, as well as 
to review whether SDS is working well for particular users. They are still 
responsible for individuals receiving SDS.(15) (17) (55) (56) (61) (64) (69) (74) (77) (99) (112) 
(127) (133) (139) (144) (160) (165) (166) (167) This may be particularly relevant in the case of 
older users, because their needs are likely to change over time.(101) There are 
suggestions that using payment cards may be an easy way of monitoring 
individual spend.(168) Theoretically, these can be charged up with money so that 
there is no need for a separate bank account (which may be difficult for users 
to establish). It is not clear how such ideas about monitoring relate to calls for 
‘light touch’ approaches (as called for by Homer and Gilder) (27) and there is no 
evidence of how they work in practice across the social care system. 
Monitoring is said to be particularly important in rural areas as people in 
these locations could become isolated.(15)  LAs may need to take some 
responsibility for emergency planning,(57) (118) building this capacity into 
support plans. 
 
5.5 SDS should not be viewed as primarily or even necessarily a cost-saving 
exercise. It can be expensive (9) (68) (95) (114) and while outcomes may be better 
they may be more costly.(35) (36)  Some argue that government at local and 
national levels must be prepared to provide extra funds during the 
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implementation process.(98) (103) (104) (106) This may be easier for larger LAs with 
more sizable budgets because start-up costs may mean that aspects of SDS 
are more efficient to run on a larger scale.(24)  
 
5.6 There is a view that LAs should be prepared to spend more money in rural 
areas for the following reasons: 
 
• To cover higher transport costs;(15) (92) 
• Because some older people in rural areas may not want to hire care workers 
from their immediate local area because they may be embarrassed about 
exposing vulnerabilities within a small community; (15) 
• To pay for/set up advocacy services where these do not exist; (84) 
• To encourage providers to move into these areas. (57) 
 
5.7 SDS policies/individual support plans should be focused on outcomes, not on 
fitting users into existing services. This will encourage flexibility and 
creativity.(17) (21) (64) (67) (75) (90) (116) (140) (144) (160) (162) (168)  
 
5.8 Service users should be consulted and involved in SDS implementation 
schemes from the outset to ensure it works.(10) (17) (19) (21) (56) (61) (75) (95) (96) (99) (106) 
(123) (128) (131) (132) (165) (169)  So too, should front-line staff.(12) (35)  
 
5.9 Evidence from early schemes is that the time at which SDS is offered is 
important. People in crisis (such as when in very poor health) are not in a good 
position to make long-term choices about their support. Some suggest that the 
best time for them might be at first review stage.(121) This might be appropriate 
for older people in particular.(35) (49) (62) (117) (148)  
 
5.10 Nonetheless, others argue that it should be recognised that SDS is a universal 
system and that IBs or DPs may not be the ‘right’ option for every service 
user.(64) (90) (128) However, there is little evidence of the working of different forms 
of deployment. Some users have welcomed the opportunity to ‘split’ support, 
managing some money themselves but leaving the LA to provide other 
services.(33) (66) (100)  This option is said in relation to older people in particular, 
because they may be more wary of managing money; their needs may be 
fluctuating or they may not wish for the responsibility of employing of choosing 
staff. Again this is sometimes said in relation to older people.(62) (148) 
 
Leadership  
5.11 It is suggested that SDS champions should be identified so that they may 
spread support for the policy.(89) (90) (96) (97) (107) (113) (125) (128) (148) For example, 
specific or dedicated DP officers or even a team could be established within 
each LA (94) (107) (125) (128) (131) (160) or for specific service user groups (116) such as 
mental health users. Furthermore, some suggest that a national forum would 
enable leadership staff to share best practice.(106) For problems that may not be 
resolvable at local level, or appear to be commonly experienced, a DP hotline 
may be a way to offer advice to staff uncertain about specifics.(91) (97) (131) 
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5.12 Overall, it is widely observed that strong leadership is a key enabling factor 
and that the characteristics of this might include: 
 
• Being able to work with and to motivate teams.(61) (88) (89) (90) (98) (112) (113) (126) (129) 
• Being able to work in a discrete or innovative team to develop a new system 
while the current system is still in place.(27) 
• Being able to work within the LA itself with credibility, and having the ability to 
work with others’ priorities and concerns.(27) (32) (37) (61) (69) (88) (89) (92) (93) (96) (105) 
(109) (113) (122) (128) (131) (132) (133) (135) (148) (150) (152) 
• Central government support from named or discrete teams able to manage 
political interfaces.(84) (92) (105) (122) (150) 
o This is because targets set by central government increase SDS 
uptake.(94) (107) (125) There has been a suggestion that targets should 
be set and then publicised in order to be most effective.(3) The costs 
of this are not seen as unduly high.(170) 
o One study concludes that a government lead would be helpful 
generally to change cultures.(107)  
o In New Zealand, a report summarising international experience 
identifies a need for: ‘clear policy and political mandate and 
leadership’ (163) with strong emphasis on coherence or consistency, 
a commitment to equity, and accessibility. 
 
5.13 Similar to observations that culture is important within localities (and that this 
may explain variations in SDS take up), (107) some experiences suggest that a 
steering group should be established to support leaders. (32) (93) (106). (129) 
The latter report recommends that user representation is helpful on such 
groups and another report suggests that these groups should be multi-agency 
and multi-disciplinary.(109)  More widely, multi-agency working is reported to 
be essential if SDS is to work effectively.(10) (12) (32) (75) (90) (97) (98) (103) (109) (113) (128) 
(164) 
 
5.14 Whatever form SDS takes at local levels there are calls for SDS 
implementation or roll out to have a realistic action plan and clear 
implementation procedures, (89) (129) including the provision of publicity 
materials. (107) 
 
5.15 Several studies have suggested that within the wider LA, commissioning 
procedures may need to change in recognition of the different requirements of 
SDS. It is suggested that these may entail moves: 
 
• Away from large agencies towards smaller, local provider organisations; (9) 
• To greater focus on developing a market within which service users can make 
choices; (59) (116)  
• Away from block contracts; (18) (50)  
• To ensure that all user groups are adequately (presumably this also means 
equitably) served, including people with mental health problems.(32) 
 
5.16 Others observe that SDS needs to be part of wholesale system change within 
social care.(11) (32) (46) (52) (88) (96) (102) (130) (131) (134) (135) (155) (166)  
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User and carer interests 
5.17 There is much comment on the need for information about SDS and its optimal 
characteristics. Similar points are made about the quality of information needed 
for the workforce, service users and carers:  
 
• It should be accessible and intelligible.(20) (22) (23) (29) (32) (40) (58) (70) (83) (92) (97) (105) 
(109) (111) (121) (127) (128) (132) (139) (152)  Clearly, no-one argues that information 
should be inaccessible and in England and Scotland a wide variety of third 
sector groups (90) (171) has recently produced publicity and information about 
SDS. Such work echoes the long-held views that local support organisations 
facilitate SDS take up and sustainability.(23) Some studies advocate the 
production of accessible information (172) and their general suggestions 
include using a variety of formats (including, for example, video for those 
unable to read), targeting information at particular groups, signposting 
information clearly on websites, and assuring users that information is up to 
date. 
• There have been calls for specifically targeted information for Black and 
Minority Ethnic (BME) communities.(32) (90) (109) There are reports of the 
success of outreach work targeted at these and other minority groups,(125) (128) 
although observations are made that many older people from BME 
communities in Scotland are not generally aware of social care 
arrangements.(87) 
• SDS should be widely publicised (34) among staff in the NHS, and amongst 
General Practitioners (GPs) (often the first port of call for older service 
users).(139) 
 
5.18 Users should have access to comprehensive support throughout the SDS 
process of assessment and support planning. However, definitions of 
comprehensive support are various and not costed in most instances (the 
Individual Budget evaluation (IBSEN) in England is an exception).(35) (36) 
Elements of comprehensive support include items that are sometimes ill-
defined but the main core appears to be: 
 
• Information about fair pricing for services; (35) (106)  
• Advice about service quality; (19) (73) 
• Information about what services are available (e.g. a register of PAs); (15) (29) 
(43) (44) (70) (72) (73) (123) (156) (173) 
o One research overview briefly describes how some Swedish users 
have formed a group which awards ‘quality stamps’ to PAs.(56) 
• Voluntary/user led support services; (10) (15) (22) (25) (30) (32) (34) (46) (50) (56) (60) (62) (83) 
(84) (93) (105) (108) (115) (117) (118) (120) (126) (128) (130) (152) (168) 
• Peer support networks; (17) (20) (27) (40) (65) (77) (89) (92) (93) (97) (120) (136) (151) (for carers)  
• Advocacy services, usually part of independent advocacy; (21) (29) (32) (44) (109) 
(128) (141) (174) 
• Support from LA care managers in completing self- or joint assessments; (26) 
(27) (54) (120) (135) 
• Brokerage services, independent of the LA;(17) (40) (47) (59) (75) (92) (101) (135) but see 
also the discussion of their limits by Duffy; (145) 
• Accountancy support; (19) (21) (84) 
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• Support and training about employment issues,(27) (29) (84) (111) (118) (151) to 
address user concerns (107) and the threat of legal challenges about unfair 
terms and breaches of contract. 
 
5.19 It is important to note that these are sometimes referred to in combination but 
rarely are the costs and benefits outlined. Who pays for such support is not 
clear – and the literature does not generally discuss whether this might be the 
end user and the implications of this.  
 
5.20 There is some evidence that users with strong social networks find it easier to 
benefit from SDS.(49) (54) (61) (71) (75) (77) (83) (98) (124) (137) (148) (155) (175)  This may make 
it easier for schemes that are embedded within the community (seeking to 
include disabled people within wider society) to make the most of SDS.(12) (15) 
(33) (50) (56) (75) (77) (83) (164) (175) (176)  
 
5.21 In relation to choice and control and the use of social networks, there are many 
reports that users often want to be able to employ family members. This 
works best if the process is straightforward or an automatic entitlement .(72) (78) 
(79) (85) (118)  The perceived advantages of this are that:  
 
• It may solve staff recruitment problems; (154)  
• It is a matter of choice, is culturally appropriate; and is especially desired 
among BME users, reflected by the relatively high take up of DPs by this 
group; (41) (42) (177)  
• It is effective, particularly when supported by clear employment contracts.(119) 
 
5.22 Others consider that SDS works best if there are brokers and advocates who 
are independent of LAs and of providers. (17) (20) (29) (56) (75) (77) (84) (92) (104) (109) (128) 
This might also work well for staff facilitating the planning process, because 
social workers/care managers may be wedded to traditional services and 
require some additional input or persuasion to think creatively.(45) (64) (162)  There 
is no evidence of a move to regulate these brokerage and support services, 
little information about the costs of such services, and not much debate about 
who should pay for them. Notwithstanding this, there is a view that LAs should 
be prepared to pay for advocacy (imprecisely defined) services for those users 
whose families or carers cannot or do not wish to take on this role. For 
example, Clements (161) says that without that without this, carers may feel 
pressurised to take on heavy workloads. Leaders from the voluntary sector (159) 
suggest that service users need rights to representation to ensure that they 
benefit from newly personalised support. 
 
5.23 Many studies suggest that emergency plans should be established for users 
with episodic health conditions,(21) (27) (34) or for all users should unforeseen 
problems arise (through the use of a contingency fund, or back up staff).(21) (30) 
(57) (79) (118) 
 
Processes and procedures  
5.24 It is widely observed that the Resource Allocation System (RAS) determining 
the sums entitled to by a service user should be clear and transparent (63) (75) 
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(127) (129) but there is little yet on the systems of appeals, complaints, and 
discretion, that might underpin the procedural justice of this. 
 
Practitioner perspectives  
5.25 Not surprisingly, there are widespread calls that training should be available 
for the following: 
 
• Frontline staff – in general (16) (17) (27) (34) (56) (90) (91) (92) (95) (97) (103) (105) (116) (117) (127) 
(128) (132) (152) (169) (177) 
• Specific staff - some studies have identified training needs among 
practitioners such as people working in mental health services (89)  where 
communication skills are said to need improvement in one report (29)  ( 
• Among LA social work staff at all levels including people working  in areas not 
traditionally seen as ‘front line or direct care, such as administration (1) (3) (22) 
(32) (52) (71) (93) (94) (102) (105) (122) (125) (128) (129) (131) (150)  
• For support workers and voluntary groups;(22) (103) 
• For support brokers;(43) (123) 
• For carers and PAs, to cover various subjects such as: lifting and handling; (39) 
(120) (177) support planning; (151) care skills and communication skills; (73) or more 
generally .(93) (97) (123) (142) 
 
5.26 Some of this training relates to changes of professional culture. For example, it 
is argued that social workers need to be prepared to take risks because things 
may go wrong,  but in order to do so they will have to:  
 
• Be confident that there will be a move away from the ‘blame culture’ affecting 
professional practice;(9)  
• Benefit from LA support for risk taking, for example, through a ‘risk 
enablement panel’ allowing frontline practitioners to consult with others (69) (120) 
(there is little evidence of how this works in practice);  
• Encourage users to be aware of and manage their own risks (with training if 
necessary).(47) (49) (53) (116) (139)  
 
5.27 While there are suggestions that small, local provider agencies may be able to 
provide better care, more appropriate for the users they serve, (9) (50) (51) (94) (164) 
it is noted that they may operate in isolation. Networks may help these 
agencies share best practice.(123) (164) 
 
Summary 
5.28 The facilitators identified often draw on material related to pilot projects and 
innovations and so the evidence that they provide needs to be interpreted in 
this context. Few are backed up by cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses. 
There are frequent observations that communications with services users, 
carers and frontline staff enhance confidence and clarity. There appear to be 
substantial features in common with the roll out of DPs and wider SDS 
systems, and local solutions to problems with Direct Payments may be very 
applicable to SDS. The implications for research on SDS are that there is a 
focus on implementation and less on sustainability. While there are many 
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general points made about take-up, there is strong evidence that performance 
management is a lever to enhancing take up of SDS in the form of DPs. We 
have very little information on facilitators around blended funding streams or 
about the most effective ways of sustaining the positive outcomes of SDS over 
the long term.  
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6 OVERALL SUMMARY 
 
6.1 In this summary we reflect on some of the main points that have emerged in 
this review that may be relevant to the development of SDS in Scotland and the 
key aims of such changes. 
 
6.2 There is significant agreement about the perceived barriers to the development 
of SDS. There are also numerous comments about ways in which SDS may be 
facilitated. Many of these relate to DPs and there is very little evidence about 
other forms of deployment. Some barriers and facilitators are linked – for 
example, lack of information is a barrier and good or accessible information 
appears to be a facilitator. Similarly, lack of legal clarity is a barrier, while clarity 
about legal responsibilities appears to assist users, carers and staff alike.  
 
6.3 Other areas are not so simple. This is exemplified by concerns about risk and 
cost-effectiveness, and what is regarded as the proper or legitimate use of 
public money. In the longer term, barriers or limits to an individual user’s choice 
may be affected by the choices of other users (such as the viability of day 
centres). These are not simple trade-offs. None of the research scrutinised for 
this review took place in the context of the current recession. This is an 
important point that may affect the art of the possible. We have very little 
evidence about the best ways to monitor SDS but there are suggestions that 
what is across the board ‘light touch’ monitoring may enhance risks at a 
number of levels. These are matters for wider public debate in Scotland and 
beyond. 
 
6.4 The theme of the desirability of reduced bureaucracy and less red-tape occurs 
in several commentaries and is touched upon in a small number of studies. The 
matter relates to perceptions and the balance between over- and under-
protection. It also relates to the intentions to blend funding streams because 
these may have different accounting models and systems of scrutiny.  
 
6.5 Leadership is less frequently disputed as a necessity for such a change 
process, however, most of the commentary and experiences reported around 
leadership are in the context of SDS as an innovation rather than mainstream 
activity. Moreover, while leadership might be called for, it is sometimes lacking 
in specificity about where this responsibility lies. When talking of ‘local authority 
leadership’, for example,(178) who is being seen as responsible? Councillors? 
The director or his/her delegates? The precise parameters of leadership are 
unclear. Uncertainties about legal and risk management responsibilities need to 
be addressed at national levels; other leadership responsibilities at local level 
may relate more to communications and workforce development.  
 
6.6 Finally, the availability of transitional funding is regarded, not surprisingly, as a 
helpful spur for innovation by those who are likely to be the beneficiaries, but 
there is little evidence about the long term effectiveness of this and its impact 
on other areas, parts of the system, or other groups of users that might have 
similarly welcomed any or extra resources. All these comments support the 
importance of a system wide approach to the roll out of SDS. 
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